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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**INFORMATION REPORT**

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<b>COUNTRY</b>	USSR	<b>REPORT</b>	
<b>SUBJECT</b>	Political Opinions of a Soviet Officer	<b>DATE DISTR.</b>	27 December 1954
<b>DATE OF INFO.</b>		<b>NO. OF PAGES</b>	1
<b>PLACE ACQUIRED</b>		<b>REQUIREMENT NO.</b>	RD 25X1
		<b>REFERENCES</b>	

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A Soviet major stated that he did not like the isolation of the USSR from the West since the USSR needed unrestricted traffic with the Western world because the USSR depended on Western products. He also stated that he and his comrades wanted the USSR to be strong and healthy; this could become a fact only through friendship with the West. The West should do everything to prevent the Eastern Bloc from scoring major successes. The Soviet officer found it difficult to understand why the USA had missed her chance to establish friendly relations with Red China. CHOU En-lai would have accepted American money for the rehabilitation of his country. Had this occurred, the USSR would have been obliged to be more pliant and to negotiate with the West. The USSR could not afford to quarrel with Red China. Since China was now on the side of the USSR, the Kremlin was convinced that its security could not be threatened by the West.

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